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abstract
This paper is a consideration of four major truth gathering projects –Ar-
gentina, Chile, Guatemala and Colombia–. This descriptive study applies 
a “typology of truth” to these 4 historical projects and considers how 
these truth commissions defined the notion of “truth” in the context of 
the highly politicized context of transitional justice.
palabras clave: Truth commissions, Human rights, Transitional 
justice, reconciliation, Governmental investigations.
resumen
Este artículo es un examen de cuatro grandes proyectos de recopilación de la verdad 
-Argentina, Chile, Guatemala y Colombia-. Este estudio descriptivo aplica una 
“tipología de la verdad” a estos cuatros proyectos históricos y expone cómo estas 
comisiones de la verdad definen el concepto de “verdad” el marco de un contexto 
altamente politizado de la justicia transicional.
keywords: Comisiones de la verdad, Derechos humanos, Justicia transicional, 
Reconciliación, Investigaciones gubernamentales.
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This paper considers the notion of truth within the context of the 
major truth gathering projects from Latin America. While very few 
truth commissions actually use the term “truth” (preferring more 
modest goals such as “historical clarification” or “recuperation of 
memory”) the generic term “truth commission” persists. Indeed in 
most instances there is a real public demand for truth--not clarifica-
tion. Truth commissions are almost always promulgated within the 
context of a broader project of transitional justice, and transition-
al justice is usually guided by the norms of international human 
rights. Despite this scholars have paid scant attention to the idea 
of a “right to truth.” Moreover the relationship between justice and 
memory is often problematic, even without considering the episte-
mological problems with explicitly political truth claims. In this 
paper I will establish a framework for understanding the different 
meanings/levels of truth claims made by official truth gathering 
projects in Latin America. I contend that there are three distinct 
types of truth claims made by truth commissions—descriptive (fo-
rensic) truth, moral truth, and normative truth. Using this frame-
work I will pay particular attention to the political contexts, and 
the genres of violence that informed the truth gathering projects in 
Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Colombia. By examining these 
cases, I hope to establish the idea that truth in the aftermath of 
state-sponsored atrocities is a fundamental human right.
My analysis then assumes that truth is both possible and 
generally desirable. How, then, is the idea of truth in this context 
understood? How can we reconcile the relationship between this 
constructed idea of truth and a more absolute notion of Truth?
Truth commissions engage in social and political projects 
that make explicit truth claims. Within the texts or reports of truth 
commissions, there is virtually no discussion of what is meant by 
“truth.” Moreover, most truth commissions are mandated to “set 
the record straight.” Commonly after periods of official state denial, 
truth commissions are charged to create some sort of official docu-
ment which will become a guidepost for a socially defined historical 
memory. That is, truth commissions are in fact aspiring to estab-
Investigación y Desarrollo 21-2.indb   496 27/11/2013   9:19:47497 investigación & desarrollo vol 21, n° 2 (2013) págs. 494-512
issn 2011-7574 (on line)
“Truth” and truth commissions in latin america
lish what can only be described as the “official truth.” The project 
of writing an official historical record of the truth about atrocity or 
conflict is a fraught and suspect enterprise, but one which is none-
theless probably essential to the construction of a culture of respect 
for human rights. Moreover, the process seems to require a fairly 
conservative idea of epistemological certainty in order to have any 
authority at all. If they are to matter at all, truth commissions can-
not, in the end, simply present another alternative narrative. 
Despite the demand for and the presumption of epistemo-
logical certainty, truth and memory are by their very nature thorny 
concepts. Even an avowed opponent of post-modern skepticism 
could rightly be skeptical of the idea of “official” truth and/or of-
ficial memory (especially when we are referring to moral truths). 
Certainly while we can all acknowledge that Holocaust deniers are 
promoting lies and falsehoods, we must also acknowledge that in-
dividual experiences are limited and contextualized. The construc-
tion of a shared memory from individual accounts is complex. And 
it would be erroneous to claim that this kind of clearly constructed 
truth is synonymous with more common notions of “hard” or “ab-
solute” truths except with regard to the most basic recitation of 
historical facts.
The relationship between absolute Truth and the work of 
truth commissions becomes even more difficult when we consider 
what is known about the nature of individual memory and trauma. 
Traumatized individuals often take time to fully articulate the nar-
rative of their experiences. As time passes, details of the narrative 
get filled in. This process is slow and uncertain. Psychologists and 
neuroscientists would tell us that trauma can affect memory in 
demonstrable ways as well. Forgetting or repression of memory is 
a psychological “coping mechanism” or survival skill, but it is also 
a much contested idea within cognitive and clinical psychology. 
The process of “recovering” memory has become very controver-
sial in social, political, and legal realms. Even if there is a reliable 
technique for recovering accurate recollections of previously forgot-
ten events, the idea of recoverable memory lends itself to abuse, 
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especially in legal proceedings. 1 Despite the fact that victims of 
atrocity rarely if ever claim to have forgotten and then recovered 
their traumatic memories, the memories of these survivors (in-
cluding torture survivors) often take a more articulate form over 
time. This is always a complex process and it is reasonable to have 
doubts about the accuracy of such memory. This, combined with 
the popular skepticism about repressed memories can taint public 
understanding of victim testimony.
Collective memory (or “public memory”) is much more so-
cially complex than is individual memory. Unlike individual or 
shared memories, collective memories are not contingent upon our 
own personal experience, although we do place our collective and 
individual sense of identity within it. The relationship between col-
lective memory and historical truth (or fact) is tenuous, but we 
often, perhaps usually afford it the legitimacy of truth. Accord-
ing to the moral philosopher Peter French, “we often change what 
we remember to bring our personal memories in line with public 
memory though we may hold private doubts about the veracity of 
the public narrative.” (French, 2003, p. 9)
Our contested understandings of these complex psychologi-
cal phenomena then affect the credibility of those who remember 
trauma, especially in contexts which are very politically charged 
and controversial. The process of recovering collective memories 
is often less psychologically complex, but much more suspect in 
politically divided societies. This leaves us with significant ten-
sion between the tasks and goals of truth commissions (hard truth) 
and the political and social reality of skepticism within which they 
operate.
1  For an account of the psychological problems with relying on eyewitness testimony 
(and memory) in the legal realm, see Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, 
Witness for the Defense: The Accused, the Expert and the Eyewitness who Put Memo-
ry on Trial (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1992) or Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness 
Testimony(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). For an analysis of the 
complexity and abuse of the notion of “repressed memory” see Elizabeth Loftus and 
Katherine Katcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memory of Allegations of Sex-
ual Abuse (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996). 
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Bolivia
While the argument for a right to truth is very much imbedded in 
the particular structure of state terror in Argentina in the 1970’s 
and early ‘80’s, the model has of course been applied to dozens of 
other transitional regimes, many of which had very different kinds 
of “missing truths.” Argentina was not technically the first truth 
commission in Latin America. One year before the formation of a 
truth commission in Argentina, Hernán Silas Zuazo was appointed 
by the Bolivian National Congress to re-establish civilian rule in 
Bolivia after more than a decade of corrupt and repressive military 
regimes. As part of his reform agenda, he established a National 
Commission for the Investigation of Forced Disappearances within 
a few weeks after he was installed as president. The commission 
investigated 152 cases of state-sponsored murder between 1964 and 
1982, and was disbanded in mid-1984 without ever publishing a 
report. (Hayner, 2001, pp. 52-53)
Argentina
The Argentine case, while imperfect in many ways, began with a 
much broader mandate within a much more legitimate and broad 
based plan of democratization. It was the Argentine truth gather-
ing project which set the precedent for other transitional regimes. 
Along with South Africa’s TRC, the Argentine case is iconic for the 
human rights regime. Prior to stepping down from power, Argen-
tina’s military junta attempted to give itself immunity from future 
prosecution, and they ordered the destruction of all official docu-
mentation pertaining to state-sponsored repression. Despite this 
Raul Alfonsín had promised during his campaign that he would 
both investigate and punish the military for the crimes they had 
committed. He was elected on October 30, 1983. Inaugurated on 
December 10th, and he established CONADEP with the first week of 
his presidency. (CONADEP, 1986)
CONADEP was comprised of 10 appointed commissioners, 
all of whom had some demonstrable commitment to the idea of 
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human rights. Both houses of Congress were ordered to appoint 
a commissioner as well, although in the end there was only one 
Congressional representative who participated. The writer, Ernesto 
Sábato headed the Commission. Both the formation and the struc-
ture of CONADEP influenced the way subsequent truth commis-
sions were formed, but the most influential aspect of Argentina’s 
experience pertains more to the structure of violence during the 
dictatorship. (Hayner, 2001, p. 33)
The structure of Argentine terror was particularly brutal and 
effective at wiping out any threat of insurgency. More than any 
other counter-insurgency campaign in Latin America, Argentina’s 
was successful in rooting out and destroying any threat posed by 
revolutionary groups. And it almost goes without saying that they 
did not distinguish between active militants and other dissenters. 
The politics of dissent was eliminated along with the labor leaders, 
student activists and critics who were murdered.
The Argentine junta used a form of “disarticulating power” 
according to Jaime Malamud. (Malamud-Goti, 1996) Because the 
junta was unable to forge a legitimate political consensus for its 
power in Argentina, they were able to maintain control for a time 
by making it impossible for their opposition to solidify a power 
base. They “disarticulated” Argentine society. This disarticulation 
made it extremely difficult to find solidarity, to communicate, or to 
“do” politics. (Feitlowitz, 1998) This is the sort of scenario rightly 
defined by Hannah Arendt as a power vacuum. Only by eliminat-
ing the possibility of any political opposition could the military 
maintain its illegitimate rule. (Arendt, 1970)
The junta was able to create this disarticulation by destroy-
ing the ability for Argentines to communicate.2 Unlike the Central 
American regimes which committed overt blatant violence against 
the civilian population, the Argentine military went about the 
business of mass murder quietly and without fanfare. Despite the 
fact that tens of thousands of Argentines had “disappeared,” the 
2  See Marguerite Feitlowitz.
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official story was one of complete and absolute denial. It is reminis-
cent of the episode in Gabriel García Márquez’s novel, One Hundred 
Years of Solitude, where hundreds of workers and protesters were 
massacred, their bodies dumped in the ocean, and the next day 
the plaza was cleaned up and the authorities denied that any of 
them had ever existed. García Márquez creates this world in which 
the authorities can erase all of the evidence of the lives that were 
sacrificed. While the incident in the novel was a somewhat embel-
lished re-telling of the tragic real-life massacre of banana workers 
in Santa Marta, Colombia in 1938, the story of the disappeared in 
Argentina makes García Márquez into a prophet. In the Argentine 
case, the army really does dump the bodies in the ocean. The junta 
really does attempt to erase the fact these desaparecidos ever really 
lived. (García Marquez, 2006)
The fact that the violence was so pervasive and so at odds 
with official claims created a sense of unreality and confusion for 
many Argentines. This is not a completely unusual phenomenon 
when states are involved in massive human rights abuses. Many 
Europeans under Nazi rule maintained their ignorance about the 
disappearance and murder of millions of Jews. Poles who resided in 
the proximity of death camps claimed that they did not know what 
happened there. Argentines similarly, were inclined to deny the 
reality of the terrorist regime. But because the experience of most 
people was so at odds with what they were told, language itself 
became problematic. Most Argentines justified their experiences by 
rationalizing that the disappeared had simply gone away or they 
“must have done something.”3
The extremely high level of social disarticulation created 
by the junta prompted and shaped the mandate for a truth com-
mission. Although COANADEP served a normative function (re-
3  This is not an apology for social collusion during the period of military rule. The 
military junta was in fact a “popular” and nationalistic regime. Although Argentine 
society in general did not publicly acknowledge the brutality of the regime in power, 
there was no widespread protest, and in fact for much of this period large segments 
of the populous overtly and tacitly supported “el proceso.”
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establishing the normative difference between the dictatorship and 
the new democratic regime), its main objective was simply to cre-
ate some consistent version of the experience that this society had 
emerged from . . . to create a new official story that was consistent 
with reality. 
Since the articulation of power and communication is con-
tingent upon social verification, the junta was able to use the dis-
connectedness between empirical experience and the overt denial 
of reality to confuse and disarticulate social connections (and any 
possible coherent challenge to authority). Alfonsín and his adminis-
tration acknowledged this problem of social disarticulation (which 
was and is manifest on the individual level as well) and the task 
of the commission then was to reconstruct a primarily narrative/
forensic truth in order to create a coherent collective memory. In 
the aftermath of this atrocity, the need for re-articulation (not rec-
onciliation in this case) was considered (rightly) to be a condition of 
democracy and justice. Inasmuch as truth is a necessary precondi-
tion for the implementation of democratic norms, the right to truth 
can be assumed to exist in traumatized societies.
I believe our understanding of the “right to truth” is very 
much influenced by the precise structure of repression in Argentina 
before 1983. There are some factors which are more or less universal 
inasmuch as terrorist states never publicize their crimes. But there 
are also some particular factors about the Argentine case—the lack 
of quasi-legal justifications or pretense, the massive use of disap-
pearance as their primary tactic, and the impact on the educated 
urban middle and upper classes. These things made social disar-
ticulation and confusion more intense than in many other cases.
CONADEP really had to articulate what happened. . . who 
died, who murdered them, and how and when did it happen? And 
subsequently, what happened to their bodies, and what happened 
to the infants who were kidnapped or born in captivity? This kind 
of descriptive or forensic truth is the least problematic. Where it 
cannot rely on physical evidence (bodies), it can be contested and 
often will be, but it is nevertheless straightforward to make a truth 
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claim about how someone was murdered. Such a claim in fact is ei-
ther true or false. There is little room for subjective interpretation.
  Apart from the need for clarification of historical “facts,” 
traumatized societies also require more in order to become re-artic-
ulated, politically participatory, democratic societies. New regimes 
must not only explain what happened, but they must condemn it 
and create new norms. Moreover, in post-conflict societies, there is 
often a need for a deeper kind of reconciliation.
 Ernesto Sabato acknowledged the need for moral truth 
claims in the introduction to CONADEP’s widely distributed report, 
Nunca Mas, but the body of the report stays descriptive in its con-
tent. (CONADEP, 1986) Nevertheless, the very idea of a new regime 
establishing a truth commission to not only clarify what happened, 
but also to condemn it was revolutionary. The most important po-
litical goal of CONADEP and Nunca Mas was to reject the actions 
of the military junta and to define the new regime in a way that 
drew a stark moral line between itself and the junta. It was an at-
tempt at both a descriptive and a moral truth claim, and as I said 
earlier, there was a normative function as well as the work of the 
truth commission formed an integral part of the re-construction of 
Argentine democracy. Subsequent truth gathering projects in Latin 
America and elsewhere more ambitiously attempted to establish 
more complex kinds of truths. In order to elaborate and clarify 
what truth claims mean in the context of these overtly political 
processes, I have established a typology of truth claims: (1) descrip-
tive truth; (2) moral truth, (3) normative truth, and perhaps (4.) 
prescriptive truth. It is my belief that truth commissions function 
best when the norms of international human rights are strength-
ened, and when the truth is connected to those norms, and contrib-
utes to their elaboration and development.4
There are some common threads throughout these other Lat-
in American case studies, and there is a definite evolution of inten-
tion and changing geo-political as well as domestic circumstances 
4  An example of this would be the establishment of international pertaining sexual 
violence and rape in the context of armed conflict.
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surrounding the truth gathering processes in these countries. This 
essay seeks to place these historical experiences into the framework 
for truth that I have established both in order to better understand 
the truth myself, as well as to provide a framework for truth gath-
ering projects in the future.
Chile
When Patricio Alwyn took power in 1990, he established “the Ret-
tig commission” six weeks after his inauguration. Following the 
model established in Argentina, the commission was made up of 
8 individuals. In Chile, fully one-third of the electorate favored 
Pinochet at the time he stepped down. Pinochet was also able to 
control the circumstances of his “retirement” to an unprecedented 
extent, and neither Pinochet himself, nor Chilean society had to 
confront the illegitimacy of his state-sponsored terror until he was 
indicted by the Spanish judge Balthazar Garzón. Because the divi-
sions over Pinochet were rooted in long-standing political divisions 
in Chile, Alwyn—a centrist—favored a truth gathering project 
which would have the cloak of “ideological balance.” Because of 
this, 4 of the 8 commissioners in Chile had to come from the “pro-
Pinochet” camp. Moreover, they were limited in their mandate to 
investigate only the cases of the dead, which in Chile (unlike in 
Argentina) were a minority of those who were disappeared. Despite 
this the report itself is quite complete, and goes well beyond the 
descriptive content of the Argentine report. The Rettig Commis-
sion made recommendations regarding reparations, responsibility, 
and human rights norms. Many of their recommendations were in 
fact implemented. (United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commis-
sion: Chile 90, n.d.)
In 2003, President Ricardo Lagos created a second commis-
sion to investigate the cases of those who survived illegal detention 
and torture under the Pinochet regime. This second commission—
the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture,” 
or the Valech Commission—established a much more complete de-
scription of what happened in Chile during the Pinochet dictator-
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ship. The survivors of disappearance in Chile were also offered rep-
arations on the basis of this second truth gathering project. (United 
States Institute for Peace, Commission of Inquiry: Chile 03, n.d.)
So in the case of Chile, the Rettig Commission and the 
Valech Commission together seek to establish something beyond 
descriptive truth. In making extensive policy recommendations 
that span social, legal, and political realms they make not only an 
explicitly normative claim (based on international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law), but they also prescribe 
clear and explicit remedies for Chilean political and social insti-
tutions as well as Chilean society. When the Rettig Commission 
delivered its report in February of 1991, Congress officially com-
mended it, and all political parties in Chile publicly acknowledged 
the validity of the descriptive truth presented. The armed forces 
publicly rejected the report. Nevertheless, according to José Zala-
quett, “with the passage of time, there can be no doubt that the 
facts established in the report have come to be widely accepted in 
Chile as truth.” (Chilean National Commission, 1991, pp. Preface 
to the English Edition, 16)
The Rettig Commission recommended reparations (to in-
clude symbolic acts, legal and administrative assistance, and finan-
cial resources dedicated to the social welfare of the victims and 
their families). The recommendations for reparations are both spe-
cific and extensive (Chilean National Commission, 1991, pp. 1057-
1074) . They also made very specific recommendations for legal and 
institutional reform, which would include incorporating human 
rights norms into the legal system. (Chilean National Commission, 
1991, pp. 1075-1113)
The response of public institutions and Chilean society was 
swift and unambiguous after the publication of the Valech Com-
mission in 2003. Even the military used the report to clearly de-
fine itself as part of the new regime. The Valech Commissionagain 
recommended reparations (both symbolic and material) for the ad-
ditional registered victims of disappearance and torture. President 
Lagos publicly apologized on behalf of the state to the victims and 
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their families. The government agreed to provide 28,459 victims 
(or their families) with a lifelong compensatory pension and free 
education, housing and health care. In 2009, the Chilean Congress 
established the National Institute for Human Rights which quali-
fied an additional 4000 cases eligible for the above reparations. 
And in January 2010, the government opened the “Museum of 
Memory and Human Rights,” in Santiago. (United States Institute 
for Peace, Commission of Inquiry: Chile 03, n.d.)
The Valech Report fulfilled all four categories of truth tell-
ing in Chile. It expanded our knowledge of the basic historical 
circumstances surrounding the victims of illegal detention and tor-
ture (descriptive truth), it made moral truth claims which were 
more or less universally assumed by most of Chilean Society by 
2003 (moral truth), it adopted international human rights norms 
and used them to establish new norms in Chilean society (norma-
tive truth), and it prescribed far reaching and significant policy 
prescriptions, most of which have actually been implemented. The 
two Chilean truth gathering projects remain as models for transi-
tional regimes everywhere.
Guatemala
The period of brutal repression and state-sponsored violence in 
Guatemala was one of the longest in Latin America spanning more 
than 30 years. While the armed conflict between revolutionary 
Leftist guerrillas and the Guatemalan military was investigated, 
the period (1960- 1996) was mostly characterized by a one-sided 
assault of the Guatemalan armed forces, in alliance with traditional 
landed elites upon the largely indigenous, poor rural population 
of Guatemala. Guatemala’s history of violence is overtly racist and 
classist, and the modus operandi of the Guatemalan armed forces 
was full-scale assault, massacre and terror. While there were forced 
disappearances, and the regime certainly denied their crimes, order 
was maintained by making death overt, particularly during the 
years of Romeo Lucas García and Efraín Ríos Montt. There were 
very few of any ideological stripe in Guatemala who did not under-
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stand the vast scale of bloodshed they had survived. For the most 
part everyone understood, in non-specific terms, who had died and 
who had killed them.
As part of the U- brokered peace process which presaged the 
end of the official conflict, an “Agreement on the Establishment 
of a Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and 
Acts of Violence that have caused the Guatemalan Population to 
Suffer” was included in the signed accords. The political situation 
was still very unstable, and the state itself was far weaker than the 
Southern Cone states. Guatemala had no meaningful democratic 
tradition, no tradition of a fair and impartial judiciary, inadequate 
legal education, and significant levels of political violence at the 
time of the investigation. In a similar situation, the United Na-
tions had conducted its own investigation of El Salvador’s human 
rights abuses, with very little direction from or participation by 
Salvadoran nationals. Because of this the Salvadoran report (1995) 
had lacked legitimacy and impact. In an attempt to avoid the Sal-
vadoran scenario, the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clar-
ification and its team of investigators was a mixed body, which 
included both Guatemalans and international scholars and experts. 
The chair of the three-member Commission was the German law 
professor Christian Tomuschat. The other two commissioners were 
Guatemalan. The agreement which mandated the formation of the 
commission also limited its investigation by prohibiting the in-
vestigation from publishing the names of the perpetrators. This 
controversial aspect of the mandate led to a parallel process un-
dertaken by the Catholic Church—The Recuperation of Historical 
memory project, or REHMI.
The  UN-sponsored commission presented its report in a 
formal ceremony on February 25, 1999. They reported that over 
200,000 individuals were killed during the decades-long conflict. 
The vast majority (93%) were murdered by State forces and relat-
ed paramilitaries. 83% of the victims were ethnically indigenous. 
As was the case with truth commission report in El Salvador, the 
Guatemalan truth commission condemned the role of the United 
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States. The Commission recommended public memorialization, 
reparations, state-support for exhumations, and structural reform 
in the military and the judiciary. (Comision para el Esclarecimiento 
Historico, 1999) While the report was not explicitly rejected by the 
government of Álvaro Arzú, his government did explicitly reject 
the policy recommendations (public memorialization, reparations, 
and public support for exhumations) included in the report. In 
2004 the government established a “National Day of Dignity” to 
remember the victims. But none of the other recommendations has 
been acted upon in any meaningful way. ( United States Institutue 
of Peace, Truth Commission: Guatemala, n.d.).
The Guatemalan truth commission was effective in estab-
lishing a base line for descriptive and forensic truth. Although the 
incontrovertible facts are still challenged to some extent in Guate-
mala, the truth commission did establish the actual truth of Gua-
temalan history as the official truth. The Guatemalan government 
and Guatemalan society has been slower to address the moral truth 
claims of the report largely because of the racism and classism that 
persist in Guatemalan society. Although the Guatemalan Com-
mission for Historical Clarification made some limited normative 
and prescriptive claims, it had virtually no impact on Guatemalan 
governance or the way powerful groups (including the government 
and the military) have remembered the past.
The REHMI project was spear-headed by the Archbishopric 
of Guatemala, and Bishop Juan Gerardi. Initially created to rectify 
the perceived injustice of the Historical Clarification Committee’s 
restriction on naming names, it eventually encompassed a much 
more ambitious project of reconciliation, which included commu-
nity-based conscientization and education projects. (Recovery of 
Historical Memory Project, 1999) Less than a week after the pub-
lication of the REHMI Report, its primary author, Bishop Juan Ge-
rardi was bludgeoned to death in his garage. The murder was never 
solved, but clearly was retaliation for his role in the peace and rec-
onciliation process. And like the more than 200,000 victims that 
preceded him, the complicity of state actors in his murder is true 
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in the strictest sense of the word. His murder highlighted the dan-
ger and the pain involved in real confrontations with truth. Both 
the Historical Clarification Commission and the REMHI Project 
together moved far beyond simple descriptive truths. They make 
explicitly moral truth claims, and they sought to have a normative 
impact while prescribing major structural and social reforms. De-
spite the lack of collaboration among Guatemalan political elites, 
these two commissions--representing the vast majority of poor 
Guatemalans-- have made a brave a far reaching demand for Truth.
Colombia
The structure of endemic violence in Colombia overlaps with the 
Cold War violence that characterizes the other cases discussed here, 
but violent conflict in Colombia goes well beyond the chronological 
and structural parameters of Cold War conflict in the rest of Latin 
America. Although several peace agreements and demobilization 
agreements and plans have been implemented in Colombia, it is 
a unique case in that there has been no definitive end to the civil 
conflict. Roberto Vidal-López says “contemporary Colombian His-
tory can perhaps best be described as consisting of chronic armed 
conflict paired with chronic peace negotiations. . . in Colombia, 
peace and stability coexist with armed conflict, a situation made 
possible by the great differences between urban contexts and the 
countryside and between geographical regions that are character-
ized by distinct economic, social and cultural traits.”(Vidal-Lopez 
July 2012, 5). In this kind of context the tools of transitional justice 
(including truth telling projects) are problematic because there is 
no clearly definable transition. (Vidal-Lopez, July 2012, p. 6) De-
spite the inherent problems, it seems clear that the right to truth, 
memory and justice are of even more importance in a case such as 
this.
There has not been one definitive and official “truth com-
mission” in Colombia yet, but there have been many truth tell-
ing initiatives which have been tasked with historical clarification 
and memory. Some of these projects have focused on specific iconic 
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events (e.g. the burning of the Palace of Justice in November 1985), 
and/or they have been associated with various phases of the peace 
process.
In 2005 the Colombian government mandated and initi-
ated the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation.
(CNRR).This commission has worked under the auspices of the Of-
fice of the Vice President of the Republic. The Commission was 
given an unprecedented 8-year window, and the broadest mandate 
of any truth telling project to date.5 Within the CNRR, a working 
group called “Memoria Histórica,” was formed in 2007 to describe 
and explain the roots of the armed movements in Colombia in or-
der to facilitate reparations to the victims of violence and to further 
the goals of peace and reconciliation.6 Memoria Histórica has incor-
porated (as part of its regular staff) Colombia’s leading historians 
and analysts of violence. The specified objectives of this research 
project (which completed its report in December 2011) are highly 
analytical, thorough and far-reaching.7In order to implement the 
recommendations of the CNRR and Memoria Histórica, the Cen-
tro de Memoria Histórica was created in 2012.8 They published 
a far-reaching report in July 2013 which had a significant impact 
on the peace negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian 
government. They are tasked with promulgating and administer-
ing a Museum of Memory and a human rights archive, as well as 
supporting on-going investigations and documentation of human 
rights abuses, and to support Memoria Histórica in its on-going 
investigation of armed insurgent groups. The structure of both the 
Commission, the working group and the Center are so different 
from previous truth gathering projects in Latin America, it is al-
most impossible to compare this project to the prior ones. This is a 
5 See  http://www.vicepresidencia.gov.co/Es/iniciativas/Paginas/CNRR.aspx
6 See  http://www.memoriahistorica-cnrr.org.co/s-home/
7  See Gonzalo Sánchez Gómez, “Plan Área de Memoria Histórica” (Grupo de Memo-
ria Histórica de la CNRR, February 20, 2007). http//memoriahistorica-cnrr.org.co/
arch_plan/plan_estrategico_v1.pdf
8 See  http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/
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“post-modern” truth commission in the same sense that the EZLN 
is a postmodern revolutionary movement. The Colombian Com-
mission acknowledges that the starting point for the conflict is not 
clearly defined . . . they are tasked with identifying the origins of 
Colombian violence which are assumed to be complex. Gonzalo 
Sanchez, the Director of Memoria Histórica said in an interview in 
2009 that MH could not be properly called a “truth commission,” 
but could lay the groundwork for a legitimate truth commission 
that could eventually be formed. (Rodriguez, 2009) This is not 
a project which is attempting to differentiate the current regime 
from the past. There is no clear break from the past which defines 
the mandate of the Commission. So the origins of the conflict are 
undefined, and the conflict itself is on-going.
But Memoria Histórica does claim (with the authority of the 
state and leading and respected intellectuals) that historical descrip-
tion and even explanation are insufficient. The Commission and 
the working group must analyze a complex history. They implicitly 
make moral claims. They work within a normative framework of 
the rule of law. And they attempt to institute policy changes and 
move closer to the goals of peace and democratic stability. 
Although the example of Colombia is atypical and imper-
fect, it demonstrates how we will all continue to grapple with these 
problems. Truth may be hard, but collective memory will always 
be fluid. We can, however, use international human rights to create 
a world where those who would attempt to distort the truth, place 
themselves outside of the norms of international law.
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